AKT and ACT
Where AKT enters
AKT comes into play in three places in this market. Surplus default protection buys AKT and burns it, service nodes lock their own AKT in bonds from the Akash chain’s cutover, and ACT posted as margin keeps AKT locked on-chain. None of the three is switched on yet. The market keeps its accounts in US dollars and has no token of its own.
AKT itself is never margin. It never pays a day’s settlement or a served hour, default protection never holds it, and the venue keeps no reserve of it.
This chapter gives no AKT figure. The AKT page shows estimates for the burn and the bond, each labelled as one, and no forecast of AKT’s price.
Where AKT moves
The burn
Once default protection stands above its buffer, the US dollars above the buffer buy AKT on on-chain markets, and the program burns that AKT in the same step, so it leaves the supply for good. The money is what reaches the venue’s own part of default protection: the fees left after validators are paid, the premium that certified accounts pay for protection, and fines for defaults. Claims are paid before anything is burned, the burn stops whenever protection falls below the buffer, and no person decides when it runs.
The AKT the burn buys is destroyed when it is bought, so no account ever holds it and it never becomes cover for a default.
The buffer and the budget
The buffer is the highest protection target of recent months, raised by the target’s own recent growth, plus the headroom that certified accounts have already paid toward it, and never less than the starting level. The target grows with the market’s open positions, so a market that grows fast reaches its buffer later, and the burn is likely to be small in the early years. A daily budget, which spreads the surplus over about a month and never buys more AKT than the on-chain markets can supply without moving its price more than on a normal day, limits the purchases, and what it cannot spend stays in default protection.
The buffer is decided. The budget’s form and its period, which is a placeholder, and the small slices with price limits in which purchases run, are defaults that can change.
When it switches on
The burn is decided and not switched on. It waits for a pending correction to how the protection target is shared among certified accounts, which must be written into the specification. The market must have a record of about 90 daily closes of its own. Default protection must also stand above both its target and its buffer, with no claim unpaid. The record, whose length is a placeholder, the test against the target and the rule on unpaid claims are defaults that can change, and so is a further pause during the cooling-off period after a default.
By the owner’s decision, the burn also pauses while the AKT behind any posted ACT margin is being sold to cover a shortfall. Counsel is reviewing the burn. The correction and counsel’s view are both open, and so is whether the burn would also spend what the venue’s own part of default protection holds if the market winds down.
What it costs
Burned surplus can no longer absorb a loss beyond the stress that default protection is sized for. Such a loss is left to claims and recoveries, as it already is beyond the target.
The service-node bond
A service node is the node through which a selected Akash validator does the market’s work: checking leases, signing lease prices and running the program’s steps. Until the Akash chain’s cutover, service nodes post no bond.
From the cutover, each service node posts a bond of its own AKT. The bond stays locked while the node serves and for a short unbonding period after it leaves, and it is burned only for a provable fault, such as signing two conflicting reports. No node is removed for disagreeing with the majority alone.
Until Akash lease data is on Solana, only signing conflicting reports can be proven, so in that period the bond does not reach a lean on the reference price, which is what its size is set against. A lease-price reading becomes a provable fault once on-chain lease data on Solana contradicts it.
The bond’s smallest size is set by formula from what a majority of signers could gain by leaning on the market’s reference price for replacement compute, so it grows with the compute in delivery. No one can delegate AKT to a service node, and a node’s pay stays a share of fees in US dollars. A seated node may hold no registry entry and no position. The bond is a deterrent and pays nothing to anyone harmed.
How seats are chosen once the Akash chain is retired, and how long the unbonding period lasts, are open.
ACT as margin
ACT is Akash’s dollar-pegged compute token, minted against AKT that Akash’s mechanism locks on-chain. That AKT is locked rather than burned, so ACT posted here as margin keeps AKT locked while it is posted.
When it counts
Once ACT exists on Solana with the transfer terms the design requires, a certified account may post it for part of its margin, at a haircut set by formula. Until then, all margin is in US dollars, settled in USDC. The design requires these terms to be built into Solana ACT when the token is created, because the token’s setting that blocks transfers cannot be changed afterwards, and ACT counts as margin only with all of them:
- The program can take ACT in as margin, give it back only to the key that posted it, and redeem it on default, and these three can change only behind Akash’s own upgrade timelock.
- Akash’s power to pause its mechanism cannot stop the program from redeeming a defaulter’s ACT margin.
- The spread Akash charges on redemption has a cap, and the haircut on ACT margin assumes the spread at that cap.
- When the AKT locked behind ACT falls below full cover, every holder redeems pro rata, so neither the venue nor Akash’s tenants go ahead of the other.
Until the program can redeem ACT itself, the formula counts ACT margin for nothing. If any other term is missing, the formula prices ACT margin on the worse terms.
Who may post it, and for what
Certified accounts may post ACT as margin, and the anonymous tier may not until a later decision. Overclock Labs and its affiliates may not post ACT as margin, and a provider may not post it against a grade it delivers, a rule that by default reaches every account of the same owner. An account that loses its valid record counts its ACT margin for nothing from the settlement at which it is re-margined, and by default it may take that ACT back to the key that posted it.
ACT margin may cover part of the base requirement that remains after the allowance, above the share the account must always hold in its own dollars. ACT margin never counts toward that share, the add-ons, the next day of served-hour payments a buyer holds in delivery, the in-delivery minimum, an order’s lock or a payment into default protection. Each day’s settlement, payments for served hours and default protection stay in US dollars.
ACT posted as margin is valued at what redeeming it pays, never more than a dollar, so a rise in AKT’s price adds nothing to it. The venue keeps no peg of its own.
The haircut and the check
The haircut on ACT margin prices its only way out, redemption and the sale of the AKT, from AKT’s price history, measured on-chain depth and the AKT locked behind ACT. Its rises are paced so that it does not jump on a crash day. An account’s haircut on ACT margin and its position’s requirement are added, with no offset between them. The ACT the venue admits as margin may not exceed what measured on-chain depth can absorb inside the close-out window, and ACT margin beyond that cap is turned away. The venue publishes a daily backtest of the haircut and raises it when losses run above its quantile.
The program checks ACT margin throughout the day. A day’s settlement that the account’s dollars do not cover starts a conversion at once, with no window to top up. An account whose margin otherwise falls short has a short window to top up in US dollars. After it, the program redeems enough of its ACT margin for AKT and sells that AKT for US dollars, without closing the position, which puts the AKT back into circulation. By default the conversion runs in small sales with price limits, and a sale that finds no buyer inside its limit makes the account’s remaining ACT margin count for nothing and calls the account in US dollars, with the usual grace. The proceeds pay back what default protection fronted before anything else.
Whether the anonymous tier may ever post ACT as margin, and several inputs to its haircut, are open.