Parties and roles
The clearing program sits in the middle of the market. Every other party trades through it, stands behind it, checks it or sets its rules. The design counts it a failure if any single party, whether an operator, a validator, a certification agent, a guarantor or the Association, could take anyone’s margin by publishing a false price or a false reading of an hour.
The clearing program and the ten parties around it, with what each one pays, is paid, stands behind and delivers.
Providers
Sell node-months and deliver attested hours.
- Pays
- Its buyers, through the program, the cash value of any hour it misses, plus a penalty. Fees to the program.
- Is paid by
- Its buyers, through the program, for every hour it serves, less the delivery fee, every day.
- Stands behind
- Its own margin, which covers its side of the price change.
- Delivers
- Attested B300 nodes, hour by hour, for every month it sold.
Buyers, including AI agents
Buy node-months.
- Pays
- Its provider, through the program, for every hour served. The daily price change when the price falls. Fees to the program.
- Is paid by
- The program: the daily price change when the price rises, and the cash value of any hour its provider misses.
- Stands behind
- Its own margin.
- Delivers
- Nothing. It receives the compute, or the gap in cash if its provider fails.
Market makers
Quote both sides in the daily auction without needing hardware.
- Pays
- Fees to the program, at the lower maker rate for an order that rested through an earlier close. The daily price change when it moves against them.
- Is paid by
- The program: the daily price change when it moves their way.
- Stands behind
- Their own margin.
- Delivers
- Nothing. A maker still short at assignment with no attested capacity is in default.
The clearing program
The counterparty to every trade. It runs the auction, the daily mark and margin, and assigns buyers to nodes.
- Pays
- Each day's price change to the side it favours. Providers for served hours. A share of fees to the validators who check every lease.
- Is paid by
- Each day's price change from the side it goes against. Buyers for served hours. Every participant's fees.
- Stands behind
- Every trade, as its counterparty, within limits. A certified defaulter's loss passes through the order of default protection up to a price published every day. An anonymous defaulter's shortfall falls on that settlement's winners.
- Delivers
- The one-month lease record that names the provider, the buyer, the nodes and the month.
Certification agents
Certify businesses for the pilot, set their allowances, and absorb a defaulting account's loss after its own margin and its guarantors.
- Pays
- The loss on a defaulting account it certified, from its own dollars held by the program.
- Is paid by
- The accounts it certifies, a daily charge for the allowance it extends, and a share of what is recovered.
- Stands behind
- The accounts it certifies, up to its own dollars held by the program.
- Delivers
- Checks on each business: legal existence, signing authority, domicile and a recoverability score.
Guarantors
Stand behind a certified account, next in line after its own margin.
- Pays
- What it pledged, if that account defaults.
- Is paid by
- The account it stands behind, on terms they agree privately.
- Stands behind
- One certified account, up to a stated limit.
- Delivers
- Nothing to the market directly.
Default protection
Covers a certified participant's default after its own margin and the layers above it.
- Pays
- A certified defaulter's counterparties, up to a price the program publishes every day.
- Is paid by
- Its sources are set out in the white paper.
- Stands behind
- Certified accounts only. It never pays for an anonymous account.
- Delivers
- Payment up to a limit published in advance.
The Association
Pursues claims against a defaulter after the fact.
- Pays
- Nothing to the market directly.
- Is paid by
- Nothing. What it recovers goes to the parties owed, in the order the rules set.
- Stands behind
- The rulebook every certified participant signs.
- Delivers
- The claim against a defaulter, which the defaulter's certification agent brings to arbitration. Arbitration takes twelve to eighteen months.
Akash validators
Check each lease every hour in random panels, and sign the lease prices the reference price reads.
- Pays
- Nothing until the chain cutover. From then, each service node posts a bond of its own AKT, burned only for a provable fault.
- Is paid by
- The program: a share of fees, in dollars.
- Stands behind
- Their signatures on every check.
- Delivers
- An hourly check of every lease, and signed lease prices.
Governance
A proposer suggests changes, and Akash governance can veto them during a timelock of seven days at its initial value. AKT token governance on Solana takes the proposer's role later.
- Pays
- Nothing.
- Is paid by
- Nothing.
- Stands behind
- Nothing. It cannot take away a credit already released.
- Delivers
- Rule changes, each one behind a timelock and a veto.
The Akash lease market
Supplies the lease leg of the reference price as data. It is not a counterparty.
- Pays
- Nothing.
- Is paid by
- Nothing.
- Stands behind
- Nothing.
- Delivers
- Prices of open, paying Akash leases, read and signed by validators.
The clearing program
The clearing program is one program on Solana, and it is the counterparty to every trade. It runs the daily auction, values every position each day, moves the price change between accounts and pairs buyers with attested nodes before each month. Every balance sits in accounts that the program holds, and only its rules can move them. The program never names a trader.
Providers
Providers sell node-months and deliver attested hours. A provider registers its public endpoint, then each node with its confidential-computing attestation report, which validators verify. Its registry entry is not a legal identity unless it chooses to be certified. Attestation is needed to deliver, not to sell, and an order carries no reference to the registry, so only a provider’s assignments can be traced to its entry. A provider is paid through the program for every hour it serves, less the delivery fee, every day. It pays its buyers the cash value of any hour it misses, plus a penalty, and its own margin covers its side of the daily price change.
Buyers, including AI agents
Buyers buy node-months. A buyer pays its provider, through the program, for every hour served, and pays the daily price change when the price falls. It receives the daily price change when the price rises, and the cash value of any hour its provider misses, and its own margin stands behind its position. It can ask to stay on its nodes next month, to be paired with a single provider or not at all (if none can take it, it is settled in cash at the contract’s mark), or to take cash instead of compute. It can exit by trading the other side at any close before the month, with no one’s consent. In delivery a contract cannot pass to another buyer, and a buyer that stops using the compute keeps paying for served hours.
Market makers
Market makers quote both sides in the daily auction without needing hardware. By default, an order that rested through an earlier close pays the maker fee of 0.01% of the trade’s value when it fills, and a new order pays the taker fee of 0.05%, both at their initial values. A re-priced order always pays the taker fee. A maker that sells a month and later buys it from a provider nets to zero at assignment, and the provider’s capacity reaches the buyer. A maker still short at assignment with no attested capacity is in default for whatever the netting against buyers that asked for cash leaves, even in a falling market.
Certification agents
Certification agents certify businesses for the pilot, set their allowances, and absorb a defaulting account’s loss after its own margin and its guarantors. An agent checks each business and scores its recoverability, an estimate of what a legal claim against the owner would collect. Governance registers each agent with a conduct bond in dollars, and an agent’s firm cannot also be a validator or a provider.
The allowance is the part of an account’s margin requirement that the agent extends instead of the account posting it. Each day the program charges the account the agent’s annual rate on it and pays it to the agent. By default the rate may not fall below a floor set from the market’s measured losses by score. The agent stands behind its accounts with its own dollars held by the program, and it keeps a share of what it recovers through arbitration, a placeholder still to be set. A certified account may move to another agent unless a claim against it is open. A second independent agent is the stated intention.
Guarantors
A guarantor stands behind a certified account, next in line after its own margin, up to a stated limit. A guarantor either posts dollars in full for the account or gives a pledge with a cap and an expiry. It pays what it pledged if that account defaults, and it is paid by the account on terms they agree privately. It delivers nothing to the market directly. Governance registers pledges, so that the limit on how much certified margin one guarantor may stand behind can be checked.
Default protection
Default protection covers a certified participant’s default after its own margin and the layers above it. It pays a certified defaulter’s counterparties up to a price the program publishes every day. It stands behind certified accounts only and never pays for an anonymous account. Beyond that price, the counterparties hold a deferred claim against the defaulter. What such a claim means outside the market is open. Default protection’s sources are set out in the white paper, and the order of loss sets out where it stands.
The Association
The Association pursues claims against a defaulter after the fact. It is the legal entity whose rulebook binds every certified participant. On default it takes the claim, and the defaulter’s certification agent brings it to arbitration, which takes twelve to eighteen months. What it recovers goes to the parties owed, in the order the rules set. Governance appoints its directors, and how it is constituted on Solana is open.
Akash validators
Akash validators do the work that neither a party to a trade nor the program alone can do. The design selects the most active of them, those that reliably vote in Akash governance, by a formula that is open. Each selected validator runs a service node that signs the Akash lease prices the reference price reads, checks leases in hourly panels, runs the program’s routine steps on a rotating duty, verifies hardware attestations, and carries Akash governance outcomes to Solana. Each node observes and signs on its own, and the program counts signatures against a threshold. Validators are paid a share of each fee in dollars, a share that is open. The market adds no delegation: no holder can add AKT to a service node or share in its fees. Akash is moving to Solana under its governance Proposal 346, and from the Akash chain’s cutover each service node posts a bond of its own AKT, burned only for a provable fault.
Governance
A proposer suggests changes, and Akash governance can veto them during a timelock of seven days at its initial value. AKT token governance on Solana takes the proposer’s role later, and the timelock and veto remain. Governance cannot take away a credit already released. Rules, fees and limits sets out who proposes and how a veto passes.
The Akash lease market
The Akash lease market supplies the lease leg of the reference price as data, and it is not a counterparty. Validators read the prices of Akash leases that are open and paying, and sign them. Posted list prices from outside clouds are never an input.